Decomposing bias in expert forecast by Franses, Ph.H.B.F. (Philip Hans)
 1
Decomposing bias in expert forecasts 
 
 
Philip Hans Franses 
 
Econometric Institute 
Erasmus School of Economics 
 
 
 
Econometric Institute Report 2010-26 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Forecasts in the airline industry are often based in part on statistical models but mostly on 
expert judgment. It is frequently documented in the forecasting literature that expert 
forecasts are biased but that their accuracy is higher than model forecasts. If an expert 
forecast can be approximated by the weighted sum of a part that can be replicated by an 
analyst and a non-replicable part containing managerial intuition, the question arises 
which of two causes the bias. This paper advocates a simple regression-based strategy to 
decompose bias in expert forecasts. An illustration of the method to a unique database on 
airline revenues shows how it can be used to improve their experts’ forecasts.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper considers a situation that is very common in forecasting practice (also in the 
airline industry), as is recently evidenced by a stream of literature on expert adjustment of 
forecasts; see for example the recent study of Fildes, et al. (2009). This situation concerns 
a modeler who creates a forecast using a statistical or econometric model. Usually, the 
input to this model is publicly available, at least, within the forecast setting (the airline 
has revenues data, and there are data from government agencies). The statistical forecast 
is however not directly communicated to management or policy makers, as it may happen 
that finally an expert or manager quotes an alternative forecast. This expert forecast may 
have had the model forecast as input, but this is rarely known. It may be that the expert 
makes his own model, based on another set of publicly available variables, but it can also 
be that she fully dismisses the model forecast, see Boulaksil and Franses (2009). The 
third person in this situation is the analyst, who needs to evaluate the quality of the model 
forecast and that of the expert forecast, if available. This analyst also has access to 
publicly available data, but he has no access whatsoever to the managerial intuition which 
makes the expert forecast to differ from the model forecast.  
 In this paper the following variant of the above situation is studied. Suppose the 
analyst does not have the statistical model forecasts, but does have information on the 
potential variables that could have been included in such a model. Further, the analyst has 
expert forecasts, and he wants to analyze their quality. This situation is quite common in 
airline revenues forecasting, as will be indicated below in the empirical illustration.   
 It is well documented in the relevant literature that expert forecasts can be biased; 
see Mathews and Diamantopoulos (1989), Lawrence, O’Connor and Edmundson (2000) 
and Fildes, et al. (2009). It can also happen, for example by selecting the wrong publicly 
available variables, that the model forecasts are biased and that the added managerial 
intuition makes the final forecast unbiased. This paper gives a simple methodology to 
decompose potential bias or potential expertise in expert forecasts. Section 2 discusses 
the methodology to do so. Section 3 illustrates it to a unique and detailed database 
concerning monthly revenues of various regions for KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. Section 
4 concludes with a few ideas for further research. 
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2. Methodology 
 
 
Consider the availability of actual airline revenues data ty  and consider forecasts for 
these data made at time t – 1, t – 2, …, t – h denoted as httF | . The commonly applied test 
regression to diagnose bias in these forecasts is 
 
thttt uFy  |        (1) 
 
The null hypothesis of no bias corresponds with   
 
  1,0           (2) 
 
in (1). In this paper it is assumed that httF |  is created by an expert, who may have used a 
statistical model and/or publicly available variables, but it is unknown how she has done 
that.  
  
 
2.1 Decomposing expert forecasts 
 
If the analyst wants to understand what causes bias or success of expert forecasts, then he 
somehow needs to make assumptions about that expert forecast. Franses, McAleer and 
Legerstee (2009) recommend to assume that an expert forecast can be decomposed into a 
replicable part ( *| httF  ) and a non-replicable part te , that is, 
 
thtthtt eFF   *||        (3) 
 
The non-replicable part can be called the latent (is: unobserved) managerial intuition. The 
replicable part is the part that the analyst can create. In fact, it is assumed that the 
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replicable part can be approximated by the conditional expectation based on the 
regression model 
 
ththtt WF    1*|        (4) 
 
where  1htW  contains all kinds of variables that are publicly known at time t – h, that is 
the time when the expert makes the forecast. Note that this excludes information at time t 
– h itself. The analyst can use (4) to approximate the replicable part. Note that 1htW  also 
includes an intercept. Of course, the analyst does not know exactly whether it were these 
variables that were used by the expert, so (4) is only an approximation.   
The relevant test regression for forecast bias in (1) now becomes 
 
thttt uFy  *|ˆ        (5) 
 
where *|ˆ httF   follows from applying Ordinary Least Squares [OLS] to (4). As the regressor 
in (5) is a generated regressor, one needs to use the Newey-West HAC standard errors. 
  
 
2.2 Strategy 
 
The key idea of the methodology proposed in this paper is to compare the outcomes of 
the tests for regression models (1) and (5). This means that four distinct situations can 
occur in practice.  
 The first is the case where the null hypothesis is rejected both for (1) and (5). This 
means that the expert forecast is biased and the forecast based on replicable expertise is 
also biased. This means that the analyst has used the wrong model. Assuming that the 
expert would not have been able to find better variables, the expert has also used the 
wrong model, and her managerial intuition could not improve that. This case would be 
the worst case in practice, as both the analyst and expert make biased forecasts. 
 5
 The second case is where the expert forecast is biased, but where the replicable 
forecast is not. This means that the analyst can come up with an unbiased forecast, while 
it is the added managerial intuition that causes the bias. In other words, experts have 
replicable expertise, but the added intuition creates problems. It could be that this is done 
on purpose. For example, the expert sees from the model forecasts that, say, sales go up 
very steeply or down very rapidly, and she decides to spread forecasts on these rapid 
changes over a few adjacent months.  
 The third case is where the null hypothesis is not rejected for (1), but it is for (5). 
This means that the expert forecast is not biased, but that the replicable forecast is. Hence, 
the expert may have used the wrong model, as the analyst indicates, but she has sufficient 
intuition to render the final forecast as unbiased.  
 Finally, the fourth case entails that the expert forecast and the replicable part of 
that expert forecast are both unbiased, which means that managerial intuition is not 
adding much.  
Note that the focus here is on bias and not on accuracy. It may well be that biased 
expert forecasts have much smaller root mean squared prediction errors (RMSPE), as we 
will see below. On the other hand, one would favor the fourth case, when also the expert 
forecasts would have smaller RMSPE. Indeed, it is important to understand the causes of 
bias in expert forecasts, as otherwise one cannot learn from mistakes.  
 
 
3. Illustration 
 
To illustrate the methodology proposed in the previous section, I rely on a unique 
database. It contains the monthly airline revenues data spanning April 2004 to and 
including December 2008 for KLM Royal Dutch Airlines for seven distinct regions and 
for the world. The regions are Europe, Middle East, Africa, North America, Middle and 
South America, Asia Pacific and India. There are forecasts for these revenue data made 3 
months ahead, 2 months and 1 month ahead. For one month (April 2006) the data are 
missing. The forecasts are all made by experts, who base their final forecasts on input 
 6
from model forecasts, but to what extent they do so is unknown. That is, statistical model 
forecasts are not available.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
In Figure 1 I display the total revenues. Clearly there is a general upward trend, 
with a slight decrease at the end of the sample, corresponding with the worldwide 
economic crisis that started in 2008. Also, one can see a strong seasonal pattern in the 
data. Further, all forecasts seem to be rather accurate, with slightly larger forecast errors 
towards the end of the sample.    
 
 Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 reports the estimation results for regression model (1), where the data 
have been transformed by taking natural logarithms. This is done because the model to be 
made by the analyst below will also incorporate log-transformed data, as is usual practice. 
Unreported results on (1) for untransformed series show qualitatively the same results. 
Comparing the estimates with the standard errors, it is clear that the estimates for  are 
slightly different from 0, while the estimates for   are slightly different from 1. The 
Wald test values in the final column of Table 1 indeed suggest that there is some 
evidence (at the 10% level) of bias in these expert forecasts.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 tells us that the revenues forecasts for Europe and Middle and South 
America are all unbiased. In contrast, substantial bias for all three horizons is found for 
the Middle East and India. Forecasts for North America show bias for the horizons 3 and 
1, which is a bit odd, as one might wish to have lesser bias with shorter horizons, like it 
appears to be the case for most expert forecasts. Finally, two-month-ahead forecasts for 
Africa also show bias. In sum, out of the 7 times 3 cases, 11 show bias.   
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Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
Table 3 learns that the bias in the total sales forecasts can be associated with 
skewed distributions of the forecast errors, that is, the expert forecasts tend to be too high. 
The negative skewness becomes smaller when the forecast horizon decreases, a result 
that one would wish to see in practice. The absolute value of the minimum forecast errors 
is larger than that of the maximum forecast errors, showing that not only the forecasts can 
be more often too high, also when they are higher they are more so than when they are 
lower. These results are amplified in Table 4, where the same holds for (almost) all seven 
regions. In 18 of the 21 cases, the skewness is negative. For Europe, Africa, and Asia 
Pacific we see a strong and steady decrease in skewness from horizons 3 to 1, but for 
other regions this is not the case. 
A closer look at the forecast errors in the seven regions (unreported due to 
confidentiality reasons) shows that the high expert forecasts typically occur in 2008, 
when revenues go down in all areas of the world. One might now be inclined to believe 
that econometric models would show the same bias, but this is unlikely the case. Indeed, 
if the analyst has the proper input variables in (4), then unbiased forecasts should follow 
from the replicable part of the expert forecast. 
 
 Insert Table 5 about here 
 
To model the replicable part of the expert forecast, the analyst (who this time is 
the author of the current article) decides to include in 1htW  an intercept and the 
following variables, that is, the harmonic regressors 
12
2cos t , 
12
2sin t , Exchange rate 
Dollar versus Euro (at time t - h-1) (“Dollar/Eurot-h-1”), Natural log of USA Industrial 
Production Index (at time t - h-1) (“IP_USAt-h-1”), Natural log of oil price (West Texas 
crude) (at time t - h-1) (“Oil pricet-h-1”) and Unemployment rate in the USA (at time t - h-
1) (“Unemploymentt-h-1”). The OLS estimation results are given in Table 5, and it is 
evident that the three models (one for each horizon) all have quite a large value of the R2, 
meaning that a substantial fraction of the expert forecast can be replicated. The harmonic 
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regressors are very relevant, but also the Wald tests for the joint significance of the other 
four economic variables suggest that these also strongly contribute to the fit.  
It may now be interesting to examine if the forecasts updates (from horizon 3 to 2 
and from horizon 3 to 1) can also be replicated to some extent. For that purpose, I regress 
32 loglog   tt FF on Dollar/Eurot-3, IP_USAt-3, Oil pricet-3, and Unemploymentt-3 and on 
Dollar/Eurot-4 IP_USAt-4 Oil pricet-4, and Unemploymentt-4. The R2 is 0.308 and the F-test 
is 2.238 (p-value is 0.040). A regression of 31 loglog   tt FF  on the same variables and 
on Dollar/Eurot-2 IP_USAt-2 Oil pricet-2 and Unemploymentt-2 gives an R2 is 0.620 and an 
F test of 5.037 (p-value is < 0.001). So it seems that the analyst can demonstrate that the 
experts’ updates of the forecasts are also based on replicable expertise. 
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
 Table 6 is concerned with the test regression (5), where the fit of the models in 
Table 5 is included. Clearly, the replicable components of the expert forecasts are now 
found to be unbiased. Hence, here we have encountered the second case mentioned in 
Section 2.2, that is, the expert forecast is biased, but the replicable forecast is not. This 
means that the analyst (and thus also the expert) can come up with an unbiased forecast, 
and it is the added managerial intuition that causes the bias.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
 Given that the expert forecasts show bias, and the replicable component not, 
would it than be better to only use the model forecast? The results in Table 7 strongly 
suggest no. The final expert forecasts are much better than the model forecasts, in terms 
of Root Mean Squared Prediction Error. So, the added non-replicable managerial 
intuition certainly improves the forecast accuracy.  
 In sum, for total revenues the experts of KLM give very much better forecasts 
than that an analyst’s model can replicate. Of course, the model could involve more 
variables. But then still, the model does not give biased forecasts. Also in times of 
downturns, models keep on giving unbiased forecasts, in contrast to the expert forecasts.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
In many practical cases in the airline industry, an analyst has to evaluate the quality of 
expert forecasts, when model forecasts are unavailable, but where it is quite certain that 
the experts have looked at various variables as input for their forecasts. The part of the 
expert forecast that cannot be replicated by the analyst can be called the managerial 
intuition. As it is known that expert forecasts can be biased, it is of interest to examine 
whether this is due to the variables that were incorporated or to the intuition. This paper 
introduces a simple methodology to learn how bias in expert forecasts can be understood. 
 Application to a unique database concerning airline revenue forecasts shows, at 
least for this case, that the experts of KLM have a tendency to quote too high a forecasts, 
most likely in times of a downturn. It is shown that econometric models with properly 
chosen explanatory variables do not have such a tendency. On the other hand, the expert 
forecasts are much better than the model forecasts, so there is a clear trade-off between 
accuracy and bias.  
 Ideally, expert forecasts should contain two components, that is, a replicable part 
that delivers unbiased forecasts and an intuition part that does not make the final forecast 
biased, but only better. One way to achieve this is to make the expert to document the 
replicable part, so that the expert and the analyst can communicate on that part first. Are 
the proper variables included? Is the estimation routine carried out carefully? From this, 
her intuition follows from the difference between the expert forecast and the replicable 
part. In the terms used above, one would want to have *|ˆ httF   and then get an impression 
of te . The key reason for that is that without knowledge of these two components, one 
can never learn from past mistakes, nor can one attribute the success of an expert forecast 
to her intuition. The latter issue is important as by now there is substantial evidence that 
published forecasts in economics and business frequently involve an expert’s touch to a 
model forecast.   
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Figure 2:  
Total airline revenues and forecasts created 3 months, 2 months and 1 month ago. 
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Table 1:  
Testing for bias in expert forecasts, total revenues (standard error in parentheses) 
 
 
 
Horizon   ˆ    ˆ    Wald test 
 (p-value) 
 
 
3 months   0.338 (0.164)  0.942 (0.028)  4.285 (0.117) 
   
2 months   0.328 (0.150)  0.944 (0.026)  4.766 (0.092) 
 
1 month   0.245 (0.117)  0.958 (0.020)  4.804 (0.091) 
 
 
 
Test regression is: 
 
thttt uFy  |loglog   
 
and the Wald test concerns the null hypothesis that 1,0   . The sample size is 54, 
56 and 57, for forecast horizons 3, 2 and 1, respectively. 
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Table 2:  
Testing for bias in expert forecasts, revenues data for seven regions (standard error 
in parentheses) 
 
Region  Horizon ˆ    ˆ    Wald test 
 (p-value) 
 
   
Europe  3  0.135 (0.136)  0.970 (0.029)  2.094 (0.351) 
  2  0.171 (0.125)  0.963 (0.026)  3.459 (0.177)  
  1  0.156 (0.093)  0.967 (0.020)  2.998 (0.223) 
 
Middle  3  0.939 (0.233)  0.694 (0.075)  17.76 (0.000) 
East  2  0.789 (0.208)  0.743 (0.067)  15.20 (0.001) 
  1  0.576 (0.173)  0.813 (0.056)  11.37 (0.003) 
 
Africa  3  0.213 (0.131)  0.944 (0.035)  4.012 (0.135) 
  2  0.307 (0.123)  0.919 (0.033)  10.18 (0.006) 
  1  0.072 (0.111)  0.982 (0.030)  1.546 (0.462) 
 
North  3  0.323 (0.118)  0.924 (0.028)  10.12  (0.006) 
America 2  0.256 (0.116)  0.939 (0.028)  5.470 (0.065) 
  1  0.283 (0.109)  0.933 (0.026)  8.512 (0.014) 
 
Middle  3  0.057 (0.137)  0.986 (0.039)  1.710 (0.425) 
South  2  0.042 (0.135)  0.991 (0.038)  1.537 (0.464) 
America 1  -0.050 (0.115)  1.017 (0.033)  2.351 (0.309) 
 
 
Asia  3  0.697 (0.191)  0.833 (0.045)  14.13 (0.001) 
Pacific  2  0.559 (0.162)  0.867 (0.038)  12.32 (0.002) 
  1  0.304 (0.126)  0.928 (0.030)  5.804 (0.055) 
 
India  3  0.300 (0.095)  0.835 (0.049)  13.15 (0.001) 
  2  0.273 (0.082)  0.848 (0.042)  16.15 (0.000) 
  1  0.251 (0.080)  0.860  (0.042)  14.23 (0.000) 
 
 
Test regression is:  
thttt uFy  |loglog   
 
and the Wald test concerns the null hypothesis that 1,0   . The sample size is 54, 
56 and 57, for forecast horizons 3, 2 and 1, respectively. 
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Table 3:  
Properties of forecast errors httt Fy  | , total revenues data 
 
 
 
Horizon Mean  Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
 
3 months -0.352  -22.00  20.99  -0.493  3.345  
  
2 months -0.281  -21.70  17.34  -0.180  2.891   
 
1 month 0.424  -15.03  14.46  -0.050  3.000   
 
 
 
The sample size is 54, 56 and 57, for forecast horizons 3, 2 and 1, respectively. 
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Table 4:  
Properties of forecast errors httt Fy  | , sales data for seven regions  
 
 
 
Region  Horizon Mean  Minimum Maximum Skewness 
 
   
Europe  3  -0.518  -10.00  7.800  -0.052  
  2  -0.587  -10.30  6.500  -0.161 
  1  -0.171  -5.800  5.850  0.043 
 
Middle  3  -0.192  -3.200  2.880  0.055 
East  2  -0.128  -2.400  2.180  0.186   
  1  -0.070  -2.600  1.760  -0.250 
 
Africa  3  0.238  -3.840  3.270  -0.573 
  2  0.384  -2.800  3.000  -0.264 
  1  0.191  -3.440  3.800  -0.018 
 
North  3  0.475  -5.800  5.020  -0.402 
America 2  0.214  -6.000  5.610  -0.482 
  1  0.360  -8.400  4.990  -1.151 
 
Middle  3  0.345  -3.810  3.890  -0.086 
South   2  0.341  -4.710  4.330  -0.382  
America 1  0.356  -3.270  3.020  -0.236 
 
Asia  3  -0.550  -12.80  6.160  -0.999 
Pacific  2  -0.347  -10.10  8.690  -0.593 
  1  -0.101  -7.400  4.760  -0.584 
 
India  3  -0.151  -1.900  1.400  -0.364 
  2  -0.159  -1.911  1.000  -0.862 
  1  -0.141  -2.010  0.950  -0.809 
 
 
The sample size is 54, 56 and 57, for forecast horizons 3, 2 and 1, respectively. 
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Table 5:  
Modeling (the natural log of) replicable expertise, total revenues data (Newey-West 
HAC standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
      Forecast horizon (in months) 
Variable     3  2  1 
 
 
Intercept     -1.077  -0.267  -6.334 
      (4.567)  (4.431)  (2.841) 
 
12
2cos t      -0.049  -0.053  -0.056 
      (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
 
12
2sin t      0.128  0.127  0.128 
      (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
 
 
Dollar/Eurot-h-1    0.096  0.056  -0.096 
      (0.131)  (0.160)  (0.149) 
 
IP_USAt-h-1     1.466  1.273  2.604 
      (0.984)  (0.974)  (0.635) 
 
Oil pricet-h-1     0.041  0.074  0.024 
      (0.052)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
 
Unemploymentt-h-1    -0.049  -0.048  -0.001 
      (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.026) 
 
 
R2      0.897  0.873  0.861 
  
p-value (Wald test for all variables,   0.000  0.000  0.000 
except intercept and cycle) 
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Table 6: 
Testing for bias in replicable expert forecasts (total revenues) 
(Newey-West HAC standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 
Horizon   ˆ    ˆ    Wald test 
 (p-value) 
 
 
3 months   0.264 (0.395)  0.955 (0.068)  0.446 (0.800) 
   
2 months   0.206 (0.413)  0.965 (0.071)  0.252 (0.882) 
 
1 month   0.147 (0.361)  0.975 (0.061)  0.167 (0.920) 
 
 
 
Test regression is: 
 
thttt uFy  *|ˆloglog   
 
and the Wald test concerns the null hypothesis that 1,0   . The model for the log of 
*
|log httF   is presented in Table 5. In this regression, the fitted value for logFt-h is included 
as explanatory variable. The sample size is 50, 53 and 55, for forecast horizons 3, 2 and 1, 
respectively. 
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Table 7:  
Would an econometric model do better than the experts? (total revenues) 
 
 
 
Horizon      RMSPE   
    
      Model   Expert  
 
 
 
3 months     13.39  9.513  
 
 
2 months     11.57  8.659 
 
 
1 month     13.88  6.661 
 
 
 
The econometric model for horizon h is given in Table 5. 
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